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There has been a renewed interest in culture and identity in International Relations (IR) over 
the past few years. Much of it, I want to argue though, has been for all the wrong reasons. 
Many recent treatments of these subjects have been largely 'reactionary' in nature, seeking 
to understand, for example, why the end of the Cold War seems to have given rise to so 
many 'ethnic', 'nationalist', and identity-based conflicts. Analysts of post-Cold War world 
politics (and certainly those working within a neo-realist framework) seem to notice that 
people are talking about culture and identity with greater frequency and therefore decide that 
they had better go off and leam something about these things. The problem here is that there 
appears to be an assumption that if we simply understand what culture 'is' then we will be 
able to understand how people behave. That is, culture tends to be treated as an ontological 
given, as something 'out there' that can be apprehended, studied and then deployed as an 
explanatory variable. It is my contention, however, that we need to understand the current 
sociocultural transformations of world politics as constitutive of new political identities, 
rather than simply searching for explanations that will help us to comprehend political 
phenomena according to conventional, outdated modes of thought. We need to think identity 
beyond ethnicity, nationalism and culture. Indeed, we need to write very strongly against 
such essentialising categories. So rather than speaking of the renewed importance of 
ethnicity and nationalism, I seek in this paper to highlight the ways in which transnational 
and globalising processes are actually modifying some of our most fundamental conceptions 
ofthe ethnic and the national. I attempt to develop a vision of ' trans local politics', focusing 
less on the examination of bordered, bounded and fixed identities and concentrating instead 
on the ways in which international socio-politicallife manages increasingly to escape the 
constraints of the territorial nation-state. This involves the reconceptualisation ofIR such 
that 'the political' is not understood as a practice or set of practices which pertains only to 
relations between given (that is, prior and self-evident) actors within specific territorial units, 
but rather as a space of interaction situated across and, more particularly, between mUltiple 
territories - interaction which, again, is itself constitutive of new political identities. This 
paper complements post-positivist and post-structural accounts of 'fragmented' , 'multiple', 
and 'constructed' identities by exploring how these multiple fragments are implicated in the 
contemporary practice of (re )constructing migrant identities, diasporic/exilic lives and 
'travelling' subjectivities - focusing mainly on developments in the Muslim world. This form 
of post-statist analysis can, I hope, contribute to our ongoing efforts to delineate a nascent 
post-national geography for International Relations . 
A cbanging geograpby 
The sociocultural transfonnations associated with globalising processes are to day £ orcing us 
to rethink conventional categories of politics and community. There is a sens e in "'hiclJ we 
are dealing here not with a new and unique set of changes, but rather the ilLabili-;ty of 
dominant forms of political and international theory to deal with change as Cl Jorm of 
continuity. The fixed categories of political theory have reproduced the state as the only 
legitimate site of 'the political' and, consequently, other locations of political disco"Urse have 
stayed off our political maps. The globalising transformations of recent years bav~ occurred 
with unprecedented velocity and invasiveness. Changes in modes of social (Uld lLence 
political) organisation have been more rapid and deep-reaching in the present era than ever 
before. While these process have existed for several centuries, various sociocuntllllli and 
technological transfonnations during the last century - some of which I review beJow- have 
sharply boosted its intensity. The sorts of transformations to which I am referring are often 
analysed under the rubric of 'globalisation', but this term has acquired so much icleob gical 
and sensationalist baggage in recent years as to become almost analytically meaningless. 
Some of the dynamics I have in mind are often much less than global in scope; indeed,rnany 
of them are better understood as particularly 'local' phenomenon albeit ones which 
sometimes operate across vast distances - hence my emphasis below on the notion of 
translocality. So while I may at times draw on globalisation theory, I am not convinced that 
what I am saying necessarily pertains to 'the globe' as a single space. Rather, I arm seeking 
in this paper to understand how we interact between and across social spaces (often separated 
by great distances), and how this interaction mediates the construction of political identities. 
Let me first briefly review some of the developments which I take to be the driving :force 
behind the current period of sociocultural transformation. 
First, there has been a phenomenal growth in the movement of peoples: fre> m labour 
diasporas, guest workers and economic migrants to political exiles and the re::fugees of 
humanitarian disasters. Lives (and lifestyles) are increasingly mobile for a variety c> f reasons. 
In the latter cases (refugees, exiles, etc.) movement is often a life and death imperative, ""hile 
in the former situations (e.g. economic transmigrants) movement is usually the mull of 
global labour divisions and transnational capital flows. One analyst, for example, speiU.<s of 
'forms of international migration that emphasise contractual relationships, intermittent 
postings abroad, and sojourning, as opposed to permanent settlement ami the exclusive 
adoption of the citizenship of a destination country'. I 
L Robin Cohen', Diasporas, the Nation-State, and Globalisation' in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Olob.al 
History and Migrations, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 135. Emphasis added. 
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Second, we have seen the emergence of transnational social movements which OCCll pya 
particular political space (gender, human rights, religious and/or ethnic identity) but not 
necessarily a specific place. By this I mean that many of these movements operate across 
borders and without exclusive reference to a specific state, nation or region. Moreover, they 
often engage in activities which are explicitly critical of state regimes and/or traditi<mal 
aspects of state sovereignty. Human Rights Watch, for example, monitors and reports on the 
use of violence within states (torture, extrajudicial execution, etc.), and a group sueD as 
Medecins sans Frontieres questions the inviolability of state borders in times of humanitarian 
emergency (e.g. environmental disasters, the suffering of civilians during wartime). 
It should be noted that we tend to understand the term 'transnational social movemeat' as 
referring primarily to Western 'progressive' agendas (e.g. gender, the environment, hlUllan 
rights) - indeed, this is the sense in which the term is used in much of the literature devoted 
to social movements, especially those studies dealing with so·called ' new social move· 
ments'. However, we also need to recognise the existence of many other such transnational 
interest groups - ones whose concerns are easily overlooked because they do not fall into the 
range of activities we usually associate with the political. Thousands of organisations, ()f all 
shapes and sizes, operate across and between bordered spaces. 
Third, experiments with supranational politic forms - such as the European Union-
provide an institutionalised forum for thinking beyond the nation-state. One analyst sees the 
EU as the first'multiperspectival polity' to emerge in the modem era. For him, • it is 
increasingly difficult to visualize the conduct of international politics among commanity 
members, and to a considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place from 
a starting point of [fifteen) separate, single, fixed viewpoints'. 2 In this sense, the identity 
of each member state is in part constituted by the other fourteen. Modes of organisation and 
interaction increasingly require Europeans to look beyond the particularity of their national 
identities in order to prosper. In its present form the EU is still very much an intergovern· 
mental (i .e. inter-state) organisation. Even if the logic of integration were followed through 
to its most extreme form, complete the dissolution of all national boundaries, it is very likely 
that a European federation (which itself still implies the existence of constituent members) 
would institutionally be nothing more than the state writ large. However, what would be 
interesting and relevant here would be the social (and necessarily political) processes by 
which people come to see themselves as part of or in relation to a European identity- e.g. 
education, polylinguality, trans-European residence, etc. 
2 John Gerard Ruggie' ,Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations'. 
Internalionai Organizalion, Vol. 47, No.1, Winter 1993, p. 172 
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Fourth, the rise of global cities has meant the emergence of spaces that are particularly rich 
in transnational significance. The cities in question (London, Hong Kong, Singapore, New 
York) are often lynchpins in the global world economy and hence their inhabitants are often 
implicated in the transnational labour processes alluded to above. Analysts of global cities 
have identified the existence of new 'transterritorial economies ' and innovations in the 
spatial expression of capital mobility.' The polyglot metropoles also bear witness to 
extraordinary processes of identity (re)formation and sociocultural melange - as well as 
providing an abundance of material for the morphology of cultural dynamics. In many ways 
the global city is today the very best example of what is referred to by the notion of 
'translocal space '. 
Finally, phenomenal developments in the technologies of travel and communication have 
played a crucial role in enabling all of these transformations. By allowing people to move 
across distances and to communicate with each other far more easily, they have effectively 
led to the compression of space and time. Furthermore, our very notions of distance and 
chronology have been relativised such that we begin to perceive our relationships within 
space and time differently. Commercial air travel and various media technologies (telephone, 
fax, satellite television, e-mail, etc.) are perhaps the most relevant here, facilitating on the 
one hand very rapid transport and on the other near instantaneous communications. 
Furthermore, information (and hence its transnational distribution) has become a valuable 
commodity in and of itself. 
Gaps, borderzones and translocalities 
These five transformative forces are contributing towards the emergence of 'gaps' in the 
global architecture, a 'liminal space that cuts across inside/outside, a space that is neither 
within the state nor an aspect of the international state system but animates both' . 4 Many 
writers from a variety of disciplinary projects are writing about these gaps using an equally 
diverse range of terminologies and theoretical rubrics. James Rosenau has his 'Frontier';' 
Michael Kearney and Renato Rosaldo write about ethnographies in the 'borderzones,;6 Homi Bhabha 
1 Saskia Sassen, The Global City, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991 . 
4 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph' ,Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society' in 
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), Transnational Religion and Fading States, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. I 
S James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
6 Michael Kearney, 'Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire', Journal of 
Historical Sociology, Vol. 4, No. I, 1991; and Renato Rosaldo, Culture and Truth : The Remaking of 
Social Analysis, London: Routledge, 1993. 
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locates hybrid identities in the interstices of a 'third space'? - and we find him echoed in 
Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg's proposition ofa 'third time-space'. Susanne Hoeber 
Rudolph analyses non-state identities as a form of 'transnational civil society'! and ArjUrl 
Appadurai looks to 'translocalities' to find the contours of a post-national geography.' Each 
of these tropes is of course a world unto itself, and it would do them (and their authors) grea.t 
discursive violence to simply conflate them. There is however a sense in which all of these 
theorists are writing about very similar phenomena, but with the obvious caveat that each 
does so within his or her own normative and (usually) disciplinary context. 
In all of this thinking there is an implicit (and often explicit) concern with the 'anti-national' 
which allows us to bring in Arjun Appadurai's conception of translocality as a space in 
which the hegemony of nationalist politics is challenged by fOnTIS of life which refuse to 
recognise the limits of the state as the limits of its politics. The trans local is the space tha-t 
bridges place, a 'dwelling-in-travelling'. In one sense we are speaking of an empowering 
distanciation, the ability to defy by not staying put, by not allowing the state to render one 
'static'. At the same time, however, translocality is also dislocation and displacement. It is 
about being neither here nor there, neither one nor the other. 'Living in the border', write 
Lavie and Swedenburg, 'is frequently to experience the feeling of being trapped in an 
impossible in-between ... ' 10 To inhabit the borderzone is to threaten the hegemony of an 
International Relations with a very limited capacity to 'see' other forms of politics outsi<le its 
statist framework. 
Unsurprisingly, then, International Theory has not been very effective in accounting for these: 
sociocultural transformations and their concomitant translocal polities. There are, of course" 
some notable exceptions. Certain trends in contemporary IR theory have recently begun to 
put the relationship between politics and political space under intense scrutiny. This critical 
literature has been the result of two inter-related phenomena. The first factor motivating this 
critical project is an increased awareness of the questions posed by the transformations I have: 
identified above, political forces which are trans-, anti- or post-national in nature. How 
should we account for forms of politics which increasingly transcend (or which never ever 
really fit into) the limits of the nation-state in the sense of a bounded, fixed space? Or, to put: 
it another way, how can we escape 'a politics of little boxes' ?II The second is a growing; 
appreciation of the fact that many of our seemingly natural and unproblematised categories 
7 Homi Bhabha, The Location a/Culture, London: Routledge, 1994 
• Rudolph, op. cit. 
, Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions a/Globalization, Minneapolis : Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
10 Lavie and Sweden burg, p. 15 
" R.B.! . Walker, 'International Relations and the Concept of the Political', in Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995" p. 324 
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of political thought have been constituted as such only through various processes of 
discursive hegemony, processes which are themselves deeply political in nature. By 
abandoning what it regards as the ahistorical essentialism of traditional political analysis, the 
critical turn in international theory seeks to investigate the socio-political and historical 
contexts which have produced (and reproduced) particular forms of knowledge as 'political 
theory' . We can gain some insight into this thinking via the work of one writer within this 
critical trend, Warren Magnusson. 
Magnusson's work has also focused on the problem of modernity and where it locates 
legitimate political activity. By looking at what goes on in the 'gaps' between societies and 
states, Magnusson seeks to identifY forms of 'global popular politics' : 
My claim is that popular politics occurs at the juncture oflocalities and movements, 
and that state-centric theories conceal the character of politics by reifYing localities 
and movements as dimensions of the state or of prepolitical civil society ... Mine is 
a worm's-eye view, which focuses on realities at the margin between 'the state ' 
and'civil society', or between formalized politics and social actions. At first sight, 
these realities seem far removed from international relations, but in fact they are the 
presence of popular politics in the global domain. 12 
On Magnusson's reading, the mlljority of contemporary political science and sociology still 
sees society as an entity defined in relation to the state, and politics as a process of 
government which links civil society to the state - and certainly only within the state. In this 
regard, both disciplines tend to ignore political processes which do not fit into a cybernetic 
dynamic of state-civil society relations. iJ Like Walker, Magnusson's dissatisfaction with 
conventional idioms of the political also leads him to consider the role of social movements. 
He makes the important point that social movements tend to be considered political only 
when they become institutionalised - that is, when pinned down and made to wear the garb 
of proper politics. 'This suggests that the collective activities of ordinary people, in working 
out new understandings of themselves and bringing those understandings into the world, are 
themselves prepolitical. Thus, the creative social activity in which ordinary people are most 
likely to be engaged appears beyond or outside politics'. 14 He goes on to argue that this 
distorted view of social movements arises from a political imagination constrained by state-
centric conceptions of what it means to act politically. 'If we begin with popular political 
12 Warren Magnusson, 'The Reification of Political Community', in R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. 
Mendlovitz (eds.), Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1990, p. 45 
Il Ibid., p. 51 
14 Ibid. , p. 52. Emphasis added. 
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activity', he argues, 'rather than from the enclosure imposed upon it, another dimensi<m of 
reality emerges' . 15 Magnusson sees social movements as the cutting edge of a creative 
politics embedded in the minutiae of daily life, and emphasises the important role of 
localities in providing a socio-cultural context for the elaboration of popular politics: 
Localities are the venues for such politics. They are the places where the variOl.ls 
practices of domination meet with the practices of political resistance and invention. 
Politics as a creative popular activity thus occurs at the junctures of localities and 
movements. These junctures are obscured by the reification of political community 
as the state and political theory as the theory of the state. To focus on these junctures 
is to open two analytic dimensions: first, locality as the place where movements arise 
and where they meet; and, second, movement as a mode of action that redefines 
political community, and hence connects localities to one another. In exploring these 
dimensions, we become acutely conscious of the fact that the state never fully 
contains the everyday experience of politics or political community.16 
It is these junctures - the interstices oflocalities and movements - that I calltranslocaTilies. 
My claim, in short, is that these junctures are replete with international relations but not of 
a sort which International Relations would recognise. Because the state never fully cofttains 
the everyday experience of politics or political community, conventional IR theory fails to 
account for a great deal of political activity. As the relationship between political identity and 
those categories closely associated with the state (e.g. citizenship and nationality) becomes 
increasingly tenuous, the conceptual language with which we read and write political identity 
requires rethinking. 
Having recognised the value of the critical tum in IR and taking much of its insight as a 
departure point, I want to now go on to suggest that more thorough work in the theorisation 
of transnational political identity is being done elsewhere. Sociology and anthropology :have 
in recent years provided important new ways of thinking about political identity in the wake 
of globalised structures and processes. Furthermore, it is in these fields that we find the :most 
cogent analyses oftransnational identities, new idioms of citizenship and 'travelling cult1l.lfes' 
- life in the gaps. Where criticallR has mostly identified key problematiques, sociology and 
anthropology have offered wide-ranging theoretical and empirical investigations. My- aim 
in the following section is to survey developments in these fields and, via an exploration of 
the work of several key figures, to demonstrate that sociology and anthropology :have 
extremely important things to say about (and to) International Relations - particularly ~iven 
the present climate of global sociocultural transformation. 
IS Ibid. 
" Ibid., p. 55 
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The anthropology of relating internationally 
What we may ask, have students of peoples (the anthropologists) and students of states (the 
scholars ofIR) had to say to each other? Surprisingly little actually. Instances of interactioIll 
between anthropology and international relations have been far and few between. This cam 
be explained to a large extent by the ways in which these disciplines have been represented-
International relations is supposedly concerned with the lofty heights and intrigues of 
intergoverrunental forums, that is with various forms of 'important' 'high' politics_ 
Anthropology, on the other hand, functions to provide us with 'academic' accounts of strange 
and exotic peoples living in far-away villages - places which are somehow without politics ~ 
where instead we find only kin-groups, rites of passage, and violent rituals. There is~ 
however, actually a great deal of discursive overlap between anthropology and international 
relations in that they are both fields whose more traditional variants specialise in the 
construction of 'Others ' - exotic cultures in one case, and enemies of the nation-state in the 
other. 
Among the official academic disciplines anthropology is unusual in the degree to 
which it has been assigned responsibility for articulating differentiation, and thus 
engaging in the intellectual/symbolic reproduction of differentiation, on a global 
scale, with respect to 'less developed peoples' as compared with 'us' . 17 
This statement also functions as a remarkably accurate description of what goes on in much 
of International Relations. There is a striking resemblance between the anthropological 
categories of 'the horne' and 'the field' and IR's construction of 'the domestic' and 'the 
foreign' . Fieldwork (or the 'diplomatic mission') allows 'us' to venture forth and gain 
information about 'them' . Recent self-reflexive trends in anthropology have, however, begun 
to problematise the whole notion of'the field'. As James Clifford notes: 
There is no longer any place overview (mountaintop) from which to map human 
ways of life .. . Mountains are in constant motion. So are islands: for one cannot 
occupy, unambiguously, a bounded cultural world from which to journey out and 
analyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly influence, dominate, parody, 
translate, and subvert one another. Cultural analysis is always enmeshed in global 
movements of difference and power. How [thenJ ... can ethnography- at horne or 
abroad- define its object of study in ways that permit detailed, local, contextual 
analysis and simultaneously the portrayal of global implicating forces?I' 
" Kearney, op. cit., p. 64 
18 James Clifford' ,lntroduction: Partial Truths', in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), Writing 
Culture: The Poetics and Politics oj Ethnography, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, p. 22 
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Likewise, we need to ask how IR can accomplish the same. I take this to be the ce:ntral 
problem of the social sciences at the present time. How can we understand the ways in which 
particularities stretch and reshape themselves over distances? What happens to culture vvhen 
it travels? I want to argue that a richer appreciation of these phenomena can be gained by 
adopting what we might call 'ontologies and epistemologies of unboundedness' . 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that one cannot so easily map peoples and cultures ooday 
by reference to static, fixed localities. As people move, the meaning of locality can itself 
shift such that it comes to refer to more than just a geographic notion of ' here' _ Identity and 
place increasingly travel together. Uprooted and diasporic cultures reconstitute homes away 
from home, and hence the imagination of new distanciated communities means that 'the 
local' can spread itself across and between bounded spaces. As Olwig puts it, 'important 
frameworks of life and sources of identification should ... be sought in the cultural sites which 
have emerged in the interstices between local and global conditions of life'. " Her workon 
the people of the West Indian island of Nevis is a prime example of how anthropology 
becomes transnational. In order to gain a better picture of contemporary Nevisian life, () lwig 
found that she had to carry out her fieldwork in four separate 'fields': Nevis itself; :New 
Haven, Connecticut, a key destination of early twentieth century Nevisian migration; Leeds, 
England, which received many Nevisians in the 1950s and 60s; and the US Virgin Islands. 
She alludes to the sense in which her presence in anyone of these fields could only tell part 
of the story: 
Even though the field work of necessity was grounded in specific locations, it took 
place within a non-local cultural space related to the network of ties which connected 
individual Nevisians residing in these separate locations. Thus a great deal of the 
Nevisians' daily life was oriented towards activities and concerns of relevance to 
people and places in other points in the global network, giving me the feeling that 
Nevisian culture kept escaping me -- it always seemed to be where 1 was not.20 
Transnational anthropology seems to better appreciate the fact that people are increasingly 
mobile and that their identities are now configured in relation to more than one locality - or 
towards localities which have been effectively' stretched' across space. Peoples and cultures 
are not to be understood solely by reference to what is taken to be their 'place', but ratb.er by 
"Karen Fog otwig, 'Cultural sites: Sustaining a home in a deterritorialized world', in Karen Fog 
otwig and Kirsten Hastrup (eds.), Siting Culture: the shifting anthropological object, London: 
Routledge, 199 I, p. 35. Emphasis added. 
20 Ibid. p. 19. Emphasis added. 
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the ways in which they define themselves between and across such places. The geneJl'aI 
orientation to which I refer might then be summarised as follows: 
Anthropologists .. . [areJ beginning to critique the idea that settled life in particular 
places necessarily is a 'normal' state of being. A great deal of attention is therefore 
now being directed at the cultural and social significance of moving in space and the 
transnational communities which may result from this.2 1 
This 'people and place' dynamic becomes even more interesting when we begin to consider 
how it mediates political identity. How do these processes affect and/or change nations and 
states? If we take these two categories to be representative of traditional notions of the 
political then an emphasis on transnational relations allows us to move beyond the 
boundaries of conventional politics. This task has a vital normative component insofar as the 
peoples and cultures involved are often 'invisible' because they do not confonn to the 
modern political imaginary. 
Let me conclude this first section by recapping the key arguments I have made thus far. I 
began with a critique of state-centrism in IR and highlighted some of the key sociocultural 
transformations which question the hegemony of this structure. I suggested that we need to 
question today the extent to which the imagination of political identity remains nationalised 
- that is, whether political identity remains the exclusive reserve of a single national-
territorial referent. The approach I would endorse involves re-orientating the trajectory amd 
widening the arc of analysis in international relations such that its emphasis lies less on the 
examination of bordered, bounded and fixed entities and concentrates instead on the ways 
in which international socio-politicallife manages increasingly to escape the constraints of 
the territorial nation-state. This involves the reconceptualisation of international relatio ns 
such that 'the political' is not understood as a practice or set of practices which pertains oruly 
to relations between given (that is, prior and self-evident) actors within specific territorial 
units, but rather as a space of interaction situated across and, more particularly, between 
multiple territories - interaction which is itself constitutive of new political identities. It is 
when the nexus of globalisation and political practice is viewed in this sense that the 
possibility oftranslocal politics begins to emerge. 
In an increasingly globalised environment, the rigidity of bureaucratic and institutional 
structures such as the nation-state have allowed mounting pressures to produce a certain 
amount of cracking and fragmentation in their frameworks. The inherent fluidity of political 
identities, however, has allowed them to flow into, through, and out of these gaps - merging 




and syncretising as they go - thus creating new forms of politics whose dynamics hinge on 
time-space distanciation22 rather than on the persistence of a fixed territorial space. In this 
paper I have been concerned to map the conceptual ground upon which translocal identities 
are constructed under globalisation, and to frame some of the dynamics which underpin new 
forms of political practice. In doing so I have also sought to critique some of the ways in 
which international relations has been traditionally configured. 
Travelling Islam 
The second section of the paper goes on to consider the conceptual problems raised by the 
notions of translocality and travel in the case of Islam. Let me begin with two historical 
sound bites. 
On three occasions between 1649 and 1661 the Moroccan traveler, scholar and (undoubt-
edly) theorist Abu Salim 'Abdullah al-'Ayyashi plied the deserts between North Africa and! 
the Hijaz region of western Arabia. His routes led him through Islam's holiest cities and! 
several of its most renowned places ofleaming. All his itineraries - citing extended stays im 
both Cairo and Jerusalem - and a full gamut of impressions from joy to disillusion were 
faithfully recorded in his two volume Ma' al-Mawa'id.23 In it, Abu Salim never hesitates to> 
mention (and critique) local variations of Islamic practice at the many junctures of his 
journey, or to omit accounts of his many debates with scholars of diverse Islamic religio-
juridical traditions. From the somatics of prayer to contesting genealogies of religious 
authority, each new idiosyncrasy is digested and reflected upon. All the while, of course, 
Abu Salim's own 'strange' idiom of Islam was carefully entered into the catalogues of his 
various hosts. The observer becomes the observed, the curator is himself curated .. . 
Or consider the young Ali Shariati, future ideologue ofiran's Islamic Revolution, as a student 
in the Paris of the early 1960s.24 Repulsed by the urban hedonism of the French capital yet 
at the same time captured by the vigor of its intellectual life, Shariati's transformation during 
these years was considerable. In Paris his Islam becomes eclectic. The Shi'ism of his: 
homeland loses its monopoly over his religious imagination; soon non-Shi'ite and everJ. 
22 For an elaboration of this concept see Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1989, p. 64 
2l A.S. al-Ayyashi, Ma' al-Mawa'id, Fez: 1989-9,2 Volumes. See also Abderrahrnane EI Moudden, 
'The ambivalence of rihla: community integration and self-definition in Moroccan travel accounts : 
1300-1800', in Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds.), Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, 
Migration, and the Religious Imagination, Berkeley: University of Calif ami a Press, 1990. My own 
account is largely derived from this latter source. 
24 My comments on Shariati rely heavily on Ali Rahnema',AIi Shariati: Teacher, Preacher, Rebel', in 
Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival, London: Zed Books, 1994. 
II 
Western interpretations of Islam begin to find their way into his thought and writing. 
Religion is now a sociopolitical imperative rather than a source of dogmatism: Shariati's 
journey becomes Islam's joumey . . . 
And so theory travels . That which 'is' in one place elsewhere becomes undone, translated, 
reinscribed; this is the nature of trans locality: a cultural politics of becoming. But what does 
it mean for theory to travel? I want to argue that it is becoming increasingly difficult to think 
of peoples and their politics in terms of bounded localities since global ising and distanciating 
processes construct hybrid identities which need to be mapped across multiple 
(trans)localities. These processes are an important aspect of international relations, but 
traditional IR theory with its state-centric worldview and limited conception of the political 
is unable to account for much of this translocal activity. I am not arguing, as it may seem, 
that we need to write more about culture in IR; if anything I am suggesting that we need to 
write against culture. Culture is not a given object 'out there', freely available for u s to 
comprehend, study and then re-deploy as an explanatory variable. Just like theories, cultures 
are also always travelling. The anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod has noted that culture often 
serves the discursive function of 'making other'. However, she warns of the dangers inherent 
in taking the particular situatedness of a few individuals as representative of an entire 
culture. Instead, Abu-Lughod suggests that we might more usefully write what she tenns 
'ethnographies of the particular'. By this she means that we need to be pay close attention 
not only to peoples' situated ness in particular sociocultural contexts, but also to their 
situatedness within these contexts. What power relationships obtain in any given community, 
and where are individuals positioned vis it vis these structures? What individual meanings 
do subjectivities derive from the signifYing practices of a culture? 
The key point which arises from this - and one which will figure heavily in my later 
treatment of Muslim political community - is the fact that within any given culture or 
community we find various and often competing conceptions of what that identity is and 
what it means. The politics of identity is therefore not based only on the presence of an 
external other against which communities and cultures may define themselves, but also on 
the process of negotiation and debate taking place within a given community. In this regard 
we might want to speak about the presence of an 'internal other' . We should also note that 
it becomes all the more difficult here to speak of any such thing as a 'given' culture or 
community since culture is actually the product of a dialogue involving both internal and 
external others. Within what I have termed translocal space this dialogue is all the more 
complex. The sheer multiplicity of subject positions and its concomitant cultural politics 
ensure that the production and representation of identity in these spaces will be intricate. 
This is especially the case when we are dealing with a cultural form such as Islam whose 
global sociocultural jurisdiction is extremely wide. For example, in the archetype of 
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translocal space, the global city (such as London), Islam is forced to contend not only with 
a vast array of non-Islamic others but also with an enormous diversity of Muslim opinion as 
to the nature and meaning of Islam. 
Traveling Theory' is the title of an essay by Edward Said that first appeared in his 1984 
collection The World, the Text and the Critic. Said takes as his point of departure the fact 
that like peoples and institutions, ideas and theories also travel: 'from person to person, frl>m 
situation to situation, from one period to another'. 25 For him, cultural and intellectual Ii fe 
are dependent on this circulation of ideas. In this sense the movement of theory is of'tm a 
precondition for intellectual creativity. Said's main concern is with the ways in which 
theories change when they become translocal. He is keenly aware that ideas have to negotiate 
borders in much the same way that people do: 'Such movement into a new environment is 
never unimpeded. It necessarily involves processes of representation and institutionalization 
different from those at the point of origin. This complicates any account of the transplanta· 
tion, transference, circulation, and commerce of theories and ideas'. 26 
Travelling theory hence provides us with useful ways of thinking about the politics of 
trans local space. It does so mainly in two ways. First, traveling theory allows us to 
conceptualise distanciating processes as a source of cultural politics in which meanings are 
transplanted and rearticulated from one context to another. Second, in so far as this transition 
implies a pluralisation of theory, we can see that the notion of traveling theory also helps to 
explain how competing interpretations of a given culture come to exist - and how they seek 
hegemony by gaining a monopoly of the discursive field. I began this paper by suggesting 
that it is vital in the context of trans locality to see culture - or theory - as something which 
can alter as it moves from place to place. At this juncture it was only natural for the nolion 
of traveling theory to intervene. What I have not yet offered, and plan to elaborate in the next 
section, is a more specific understanding of trans local It raveling cultures. How can we best 
comprehend their characteristics? More importantly, what are the qualities which mediate 
the production and articulation of meaning in these spaces? I propose to answer these 
questions through an exploration of the discourses of travelling Islam. First, though, some 
brief but necessary comments on what me might term the metatheoretical parameters of 
Islam. 
On my understanding, to speak of a muslim (in Arabic, 'one who submits' ) is simply to 
speak of a subject-consciousness which considers itself to possess or practice a form of 
identity which derives from something called Islam, regardless of what fonn one's 
consciousness of the latter takes. I am seeking to avoid the essentialism which can so easily 
" Edward Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, London: Faber and Faber, 1984, p. 226 
" Ibid. 
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be engendered by speaking about a single (absolute) system called Islam. In the same wa.y, 
the term Islamic is problematic in that it would appear to suggest that there exists a body <If 
thought or discursive practice which can be identified as 'authentic' or 'real' Islam. My ain 
is to emphasise the multiple, cross-cutting interpretations which produce and reproduce 
various understandings of this religion across an equally diverse range of sociocultural 
contexts. 
Some writers have tried to come to terms with the diversity of the Islamic world by speaking 
of'lslams' in the plural.27 Their motivation is usually to escape the essentiaiising practices 
of Oriental ism which on the one hand seek to impute some essence or immutable quality 10 
Islam and on the other to avoid confirming the discourses of those contemporary Islamist 
ideologues who wish to portray their interpretation of the religion as the one and only 'true' 
Islam. By positing the existence of a multitude of 'Is lams', however, these writers risk 
reproducing the very essentialism they wish to combat. This approach also flies in the face 
of the fact that the vast majority of Muslims, despite a clear cognisance of their religion'S 
diversity, see themselves as adhering very firmly to a single Islam.28 To speak of 'Islams' is 
to be haunted by a sense of boundaries; it gives the impression that there is some point where 
one Islam leaves off and another picks up. I prefer to think oflslam as something far more 
fluid. Islam can hence be seen as a single discursive field - a 'lifeworld' perhaps - yet one 
whose borders are constantly changing. The singularity of Islam does not, therefore, have 10 
be seen as inimical to the social construction of Islam. It offers to its believers a set <If 
meanings, but as Veena Das argues, these meanings are 'not to be interpreted once, and 
correctly, but continually reinterpreted, for meanings assigned to the word of God by human 
efforts can only be approximations'. 29 
Islam, by its very nature, travels well. It can be, and often is, elaborated in many different 
ways in an equally diverse range of settings. 30 What happens, though, when Islam moves 
" See e.g. Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, 'Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology 
oflslam', Annual Review 0/ Anthropology, Vol. 6, 1977, pp. 227-54 and Aziz al-Azrneh, Islams and 
Modernities, London: Verson, 2" Edition, 1996. 
" Dale Eickelman' ,The Study of Islam in Local Contexts ', Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 17, 
1982, p. I 
29 Veena Das, 'For a folk-theology and theological anthropology of Islam' , Contributions to Indian 
Sociology, Vol. 18, No.2, 1984, p. 296 
"Several anthropologists have undertaken studies of Islam in these 'local' contexts. See e.g. John R. 
Bowen, 'Salat in Indonesia: The Social Meanings of an Islamic Ritual', Man, Vol. 24, pp. 600-19; 
Michael Lambek, 'Certain Knowledge, Contestable Authority: Power and Practice on the Islamic 
Periphery' , American Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. I, February 1990, pp. 23-40; Robert W. HeFner and 
Patricia Horvatich (eds.), Islam in an Era a/Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim 
Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1997; and David Westerlund and Eva Evers 
Rosander (eds.), African islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London: 
Hurst & Company, 1997. A useful overview can be found in Dale F. Eickelman, 'The Study oflslam in 
Local Contexts', Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 17, 1982. 
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beyond contexts in which Muslims are a majority? What tools does Islam possess to 
communicate and negotiate across cultures? Jan Nederveen Pieterse argues that tlure i s a 
tension within Islam, 'a global project organized in local structures', that becolLles 
particularly pronounced in diaspora." What we see is a far more complex condition~ on~ in 
which Islamic meanings shift, change and transmutate, where things become somethiTlg er.se. 
Likewise Islam becomes represented in new forms and via new media. Television, the 
Internet and 'secular' literature now suddenly all become sources ofIslarnic knowledl$e.lhe 
Muslim SUbjectivity also often becomes more aware of its religion in minority situatnons. In 
the 'homeland' Islam was an instrinsic aspect of that context's lifeworld, one which was tak::en 
for granted. In diaspora, however, Islam becomes yet another stigma of foreignness, a si gn 
of the other. This causes the Muslim to objectify her religion and to engage in a self· 
examination or critique of Islam and its meanings.32 Migration is hence a rupture, an 
important break which can lead to changes in the significance of Islam and oif bei ng 
Muslim]3 
As regards the changing significance of Islam in diaspora we again find a diversity of 
experience. On the one hand there is a sense in which the difficulties involved in practici:ng 
Islam in a predominantly non-Muslim (and usually secular) society means that the religi<on 
becomes a new source of merit. A reconciliation of the five daily prayers with the typical 
European working day and the effort required to seek out halal meat (slaughtered in 
accordance with Islamic regulation) provide a particular sense of satisfaction when achiev-ed 
in a non-Muslim context. On the other hand, however, there are also ways in the diaspor ic 
condition offers religious opportunities which might not have been available in one':s hoene 
society. For example, because migration often brings greater economic prosperity, diasporic 
Muslims are often able to undertake religious duties such as the hajj (the pilgrimage to 
Mecca) which were previously beyond their means.34 Another example of how diasp()ra C~ 
provide Muslims with new freedoms relates to those 'sects' which are minorities - an.d ofi:<en 
persecuted - even within predominantly Muslim settings. Some of these groups are ev<en 
banned in their home countries, or subject to considerable pressure from state instit:utions. 
Alevi and Ahmadi Muslims, often branded as heretical in Turkey and Pakistan respectiveny, 
often find that their religion loses much of its negative connotation in diaspora. 
lJ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Travelling Islam: mosques without minarets' in Ayse Oncll and Petra 
Wayland (eds.), Space, Culture and Power: New identities in globalizing cities, London: Zed Books, 
1997, p. 197 
II Ibid. 
)) T. Sunier. 'Islam and Ethnicity Among Turks' in W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), 
Islam in Dutch SOCiety, Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992, p. 145 
l4 Barbara D. Metcalf, 'Introduction: Sacred Words, Sanctioned Practice, New Communities', in 
Barbara Daly Metcalf (ed.), Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996, p. 9 
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Critical Islam and changing boundaries 
In this final section I want to work towards a closer weave of the two narrative strands 
running through the paper. One the one hand we have story about translocality, non-statist 
fonns of community and the emergence of new 'distanciated' political spaces. On the other, 
a story about transfonnation within 'travelling Islam' and the diasporic Muslims vlhoseli ves 
it shapes. 
In a recent essay, Dale Eickelman alludes to a nascent 'Islamic Reformation,.35 Eickelmar 
himself would be the first to admit the difficulties involved in trying to draw any hard and 
fast comparisons with the Christian Reformation. As he points out, Islam does not possess 
a clergical hierarchy or 'centre' against which one can rebel. His essay is also not in any way 
an attempt to 'push the other back in time' by suggesting that Islam is only now experiencing 
the upheaVals which Christianity went through four hundred years ago _ Rather, by referring 
to contemporary changes in Islam as a 'Refonnation', Eickelman is indicating a trend in 
much of the Muslim world towards a greater critical awareness ofreligion. Muslims are 
increasingly willing to take Islam into their own hands, relying on their own readings and 
interpretations of the classical sources or following 'refonnist' intellectuals who question 
traditional dogmas and challenge the claims of the ulama to be privileged sources of 
religious knowledge. Much of this is related to massive rises in literacy rates and the 
increased presence of religious issues in the public sphere as a result of globalised 
communications and media technologies. The authority of the written Word is no longer the 
sole reserve of a select few, and the religious elite cannot compete with the myriad range of 
Muslim voices reading, debating and, effectively, reformulating Islam on the Internet, on 
satellite television and in a plethora of widely-distributed books and pamphlets. Thus, 'media 
Islam' , a new breed of Muslim intellectual and popular religious discourse, I want to argue, 
are all contributing towards the emergence of what we might call a new 'Muslim public 
sphere'. Furthennore, I also want to suggest that translocality should be seen as that which 
both enables this reformist discourse and provides the spaces in which much of it is 
elaborated. In this final section, therefore, we will first examine several aspects of the latter 
influence, that of translocality on Islam, before going on to assess the ways in which the 
Muslim reimagination of political community can be seen to constitute a new form of 
translocal politics. 
Translocality has contributed significantly to the development of a critical Islamic discourse. 
In addition to the 'structural' factors mentioned above (e.g. increased literacy and the role of 
information technology), the objectification of religion which occurs as Muslims move 
" Dale F. Eickelman, 'Inside the Islamic Reformation', Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. I, Winter 1998, 
pp. 80-89. 
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through and dwell in translocal space (i.e. their capability to extemalise and critique Islann) 
has opened up new avenues for rethinking and reformulating Islamic thought. Many <lcuthorrs 
have emphasised that diasporic Muslims live in the constant shadow of the West, and th;;at 
their discourse is consequently over-determined by the struggle against Western hegemon::y. 
I want to suggest, however, that translocality actually enables Muslims to focus on a di iferel£l.t 
type of hegemony - namely, power asymmetries within Islam. I mean by this that in tbe 
process of displacing Islam from a particular national context and reconstituting it as a 
'travelled' object in diaspora, Muslims develop an increased capacity to recognise, account 
for, and debate the difference within their religion. The relativisation of Islam whic=h 
naturally occurs through travel allows Muslims to see internal hegemony, and translocalit::y 
provides them with the intellectual environment in which to develop counter-hegemoni.c 
discourses. Talal Asad has argued that '[t]o secure its unity-to make its ow-:n 
history-<lominant power has worked best through differentiating and classifying practices ' . 
36 The 'dominant power' to which he refers is usually taken to be a colonial or neo-imperial 
form - or at least something emanating from the West. I want to argue, however, 'that i. n 
translocality we often find hybridising manoeuvres which also seek to disclose the dominant 
powers within Islam. How, though, can we conceptualise such a thing as 'dominant poweJ' 
in relation to Islam? We do so by looking for totalising discourses which claim the au1:horit::y 
to represent the 'real' Islam and which also seek to label and classify 'deviant' Muslirns. l.:n 
the same way that the West reproduces its exceptionalism by repudiating any ethical dainas 
which do not derive from its own tradition of modernity, so Islamic hegemonies (e .g. tILe 
Sunni majority) label and differentiate those readings of Islam which diverge lTom it:s 
orthodoxy (e.g. Shi'ism). This internal 'othering' is not, however, limited to theological 
debates. We see it also in the diasporic political arena, where groups such as Bizb ut- iahriir 
and al-Muhajirun in the UK portray themselves as the only movement pursuing /I. 'trul-y 
Islamic' political agenda, and in doing so are able to set the terms of the political <lebate. 
Competing tendencies are hence constantly forced to respond to Hizb ut-Tahrir's ethical 
claims, rather than advancing their own vision of political community. 
One of the chief obstacles to critical thinking in Islam during recent years has been the fact 
that Islamist discourse is usually constructed around a set of claims represented as non- (Dr 
even anti-Western in nature . To critique this discourse, therefore, would be to betrayancd 
weaken its anti-Western potential. Another component of the same discourse has been a 
drive to depict criticism itself as a Western, and hence anti-Islamic, practice. Unsurprisingi)-" 
therefore, one of the main strategies deployed by hegemonic Muslim political discours ·e 
(such as Hizb ut-Tahrir's) is to portray any Muslim advocating a critical approach t(>waril..s 
Islam as a 'closet Westerner'. A zero-sum game is constructed in which Mus lims are either 
30 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam. 
Baltimore: The lohns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 17 
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'truly' Islamic (i.e. sympathetic to Hizb ut-Tahrir) or Western collaborators (i.e. critical of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir's political discourse). Muslim modernists who seek to combine Islamic 
political concepts with Western analytic methodologies are similarly condemned by 
fundamentalists and conservatives alike as 'Westernised'.37 It seems the slightest hint of 
Western thought in a Muslim discourse immediately corrupts and invalidates any ideas 
which might emerge from it. 
This obsession with the West, it can be argued, has created an impasse whose logic runs 
something like this: 'If a critique of Islam is enacted then we Muslims are falling right into 
the hands of the West because critique is a Western mode and hence will inevitably weaken 
Islam. If, on the other hand, we do not engage in a critical renewal of our religion then 
Muslims will never make any progress in the modem world' . To escape from this dilemma, 
two further moves are required. The first is to dismantle the assumption that critique is an 
exclusively 'Western' concept. This is accomplished by pointing out that because there is no 
historical necessity to Western hegemony then there is therefore also no legitimate Western 
totalisation of discursive modes." This first move enables hybridity by permitting the 
intermingling ofIslamic and Western modes within a single discursive space. Many Muslim 
thinkers in diaspora are happy to engage in this sort ofhybridity today, seeing in it the power 
ofBhabha's postcolonial political hybrid - or, in other words, a method for undermining the 
coherence of Western hegemony.3. I want to argue, however, that a far more radical 
methodology can emerge from this disjuncture, one that is particularly suited to the 'multiple 
rootedness' of translocal space: an Islamic critique oflslam. 'Critiquing Islam from within' 
is a notion that has gained particular currency in recent years among diasporic Muslim 
intellectuals in the West. The late Fazlur Rahman, for example, was a keen advocate of such 
a methodology.40 For him, a Muslim critique of Islam does not mean questioning the 
authenticity of the Qur'an or Hadith. Rather, what needs to be unmasked are the dogmas 
developed over the centuries (e.g. the various madhhabs) which were not specifically 
authorised by the Prophet. For Rahman, Islam has been bloated by intransigent theologies 
which have little or nothing to do with the ethical core of Muhammad's message. These 
dogmas, he believes, are often treated as if they, like the Qur'an, are somehow the 
untouchable word of God. There is thus a need to distinguish between what Rahman terms 
'normative Islam' (Muhammad's 'true' message) and 'historical Islam' (the codification of 
17 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 141 
" Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London: Zed 
Books, 1997, p. 118 
19 Pnina Werbner, 'The Making of Muslim Dissent: hybridized discourses, lay preachers, and radical 
rhetoric among British Pakistanis', American Ethnologist, Vol. 23, No. I, 1996, p. 116 
40 Rahman, op. cit. 
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these nonns by various political hegemonies)." Too often, he argues, modem Muslims 
display a tendency to conflate these two. The juridical opinions (jatwas) ofIslamic scholars, 
regardless of their renown, are nothing more than historically-situated opinion and therefore 
open to debate and, more crucially, abrogation. 
I want to argue that translocal spaces provide discursive environments conducive to such 
alternative articulations. As previously mentioned, Muslims encounter a diverse range of 
interpretations and schools of thought in diaspora. As dialogue is enabled between these 
different tendencies, the differences between them are often attenuated. This diminution of 
difference, I believe, results from particular conceptions ofisiam becoming disembedded 
from the 'lifeworlds' that sustain them in countries of origin, and, via trans locality, resettled 
into circumstances in which they are in a minority. This process of relativisation allows 
Muslims to partake in a discourse of particularity, one in which their conception of religion 
is no longer universal. Crucially, however, and unlike hegemonic discourse, this is also a 
space in which no particular conception ofisiam is negated. 
Difference is negotiated, rather than eradicated. As one observer puts it, 'You learn to 
adjust to other tendencies and be at ease with other interpretations ofIslam without feeling 
that you are diluting your own beliefs'. 42 
So what form is this critical thinking in Islam taking today? Not surprisingly, some of the 
most innovative ideas are coming from those thinkers who have either travelled abroad to 
study or who have had sustained contact with translocal critical theories. Rashid Ghannoushi, 
for example, the exiled leader of the Tunisian Islamist movement, has recently argued that 
ikhtilaf should be politically institutionalised. He means by this that a political community 
should possess the right to vote for or against the political implications of any given textual 
interpretation, and also to change its mind later if it so desires.43 The implication here is that 
an opinion is not somehow inherently 'true' simply by virtue of having emanated from the 
ulama; rather, these opinions simply enter the 'public sphere' - that is to say, they become 
contestable and open to reinterpretation. Other Muslim scholars, from Egypt's Hassan 
Hanafi44 to Harun Nasution in Indonesia, have attempted to reread the traditional theological 
41 Ibid., p. 141 
" Dr. Ataullah Siddiqui, Research Fellow, Islamic Foundation, personal interview, Leicester, 29 July, 
1998 . 
., Talal Asad, 'Modem Power and the Reconfiguration of ReJigious Traditions ', Sianford Electronic 
Humonities Review, Vol.5, Issue I: Contested Politics, 1996, p. 5 
44 Hassan Hanafi, Min al· 'aqido ila I-Ihawra, Cairo: Maktaba Mabduli, 5 Vols., n.d. 
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texts (kal'm) so that they speak to the political imperatives of contemporary Islam.45 There 
are also those, such as Fazlur Rahman, who have sought to critique some ofIslam's orthodox 
political formulations. This is part of his broader project, outlined above, to remove 
interpretive agency from the hands of traditional scholars - and, more importantly for our 
context, from the state - and place it in the hands of Muslims. He argues, for example, that 
the slogan 'ai-islam din wa dawla' (Islam is both religion and state) is often 'employed to 
dupe the common man into accepting that, instead of politics or the state serving the long· 
range objectives ofislam, Islam should come to serve the immediate and myopic objectives 
of party politics'. 46 The Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush has recently made similar 
arguments with regard to the situation in contemporary Iran. His message is particularly 
radical in that context because governance in Iran is, in theory, based on Imam Khorneini's 
principle ofwilayat al-faqih (,governorship ofthe legal scholars' ). This doctrine states that 
leadership of the Islamic community should be vested in the religious scholars because of 
their superior religious knowledge. Soroush, on the other hand, argues that no single 
interpretation of Islam is ever final and that therefore a religious state can never be ruled 
according to an 'official' political ideology. It is not surprising that such a position has made 
him a controversial figure in Iran. He has been forced by the pressures of conservative Islam 
to take up a more translocal existence, and currently spends considerable time lecturing 
abroad. 
One of the most radical projects ofIslamic critique can be found in the work of Mohammed 
Arkoun, an Algerian-Berber whose academic career has been spent almost entirely in Paris. 
Arkoun has sought to deploy post-structural methodology as a critical tool in his investiga-
tions of the history of ideas in Islam. His genealogies of Islamic reason and authority, for 
example, are highly original contributions to the growing discourse on critical Islam." 
Arkoun reads the hegemony of the early Muslim dynasties, for example, as a delinking of 
political action and symbolic creativity: 
Instead, there triumphed an inverse process whereby the symbolic capital carried by 
the Qur'an was utilized for the construction and imposition of an official, orthodox 
Islam: official because it resulted from political choices of the state, which physically 
eliminated opponents who stood for any other interpretations (the Shi'ite and 
"See Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward with Dwi S. Almaja, Defenders aJReason in Islam: 
Mu'tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol, Oxford: Oneworld, 1997. 
46 Rahman, op. cit. , p. 140 
" See e.g. Mohammad Arkoun, Pour une critique de 10 raison islamique, Paris: Maisonneuve et 
Larose, 1984; Essais sur 10 pensee islamique, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 3" edition, 1984; and 'The 
Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought' in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), Islam: 
State and Society, London: Curzon Press, 1988. 
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Kharijite protesters, most notably); orthodox because the experts accredited by the 
political authorities gave credence to the idea that it is possible to read the Word of 
God correctly ... " 
By revealing the historical situatedness of these supposedly 'correct' , readings Arkoun is able 
to deconstruct layer upon layer of supposedly immutable theology. His is a theoretically 
sophisticated methodology which provides crucial support for the more general task of 
restating the nature and sources of Islamic authority - a task which, as we have seen, is most 
actively enjoined in the Muslim translocality. Many of the writers I have mentioned, such 
as Rahman, Hanafi and Arkoun, have at one time or another been 'travelling Muslims' and 
these trans local experiences have significantly influenced the development of their thinking 
by bringing them into contact with new peoples and bodies of theory, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. 
How though has the combination of these critical ideas and translocality been transforming 
popular Muslim political discourse? As we have seen in the first section, a number of writers 
have been emphasising the ways in which globalising processes increasingly disembed 
peoples and their political identities from the context ofthe nation-state. I want to argue that 
one of the most tangible manifestations of this phenomenon can be found in what I have 
termed translocal Islam. To some degree, as we have already seen, this is a product of the 
transformations occurring within Islam related to the sociology of knowledge and the 
question of who is 'authorised' to speak (and 'act') on behalfoflslam. Muslims are turning 
away from the traditional religious scholars of their 'local' communities and creating 
'trans local' political spaces in which the authority of disparate Muslim voices is recognised. 
Often, as we have seen, the intellectuals to whom young Muslim tum for inspiration live in 
(and between) distant lands. We have noted, for example, the transnational relevance of 
thinkers such as Mawdudi and Khomeini. We can also recall travelling Indonesian students 
challenging village tradition by using ideas from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The national 
identity (or state affiliation) of these thinkers is not important. What matters is that they are 
able to articulate a Muslim (and thus 'authentic') normativity well-suited to the circumstances 
and problems of contemporary life. 'One of the most basic consequences of the new 
relationship between the religious community and society', argues Schiffauer, 'is that one 
no longer automatically belongs to a given community' .• 9 The ability to publicly contest, 
debate and rearticulate ethical claims allows those who were formerly SUbjected to the 
hegemony of a particular ethical vision to now polilicise their Muslim identities. A religious 
48 Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 22 
.. Werner Schiffauer', Migration and Religiousness' in Tomas Gerholm and Yngve Georg Lithman, 
The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing, 1988, p. 154. Emphasis 
added. 
21 
community becomes a political community, hence changing the boundaries which have 
traditionally constituted the latter in Islam. 
Consequently, we have seen marked differences in the ways some Muslim movements 
organise themselves in diaspora. 'Lay' Muslims sometimes feel more inclined to become 
involved in Muslim associations in translocality because debates about political interpreta-
tions often take on a greater significance here. 50 We also see a tendency towards more open 
and dispersed fOnTIS of leadership, such as the phenomenon of elected imams in the United 
States.51 As we have noted above, the leaders or ideologues of a diasporic Muslim 
community might actually be based in settings far removed from those of their constituen-
cies. The cases of the Sufi saint Zindapir (Pakistan) and the Naqshbandi Sheikh Nazim 
(Cyprus), both of whom possess sizeable numbers of adherents in the UK, illustrate this 
point well. It is not only the more conservative Sufi cults that have been affected by these 
translocal upheavals. The rise of the 'Islamist new intellectuals' is also linked to the 
transnational circulation of books, pamphlets and media technologies. Indeed, the new 
intellectuals' versatility with these technologies, when contrasted with the relative 
'backwardness' of traditional sources of religious authority, goes a long way towards 
explaining their popUlarity - especially among the younger generation of Muslims. Even the 
icons of traditionalism have been forced at times to pay credence to the efficacy ofthe new 
intellectuals. For example, echoes of popular ideologues such as Ali Shariati can be heard 
in the speeches ofImam Khomeini.52 And the eminent faculty at al-Azhar has had to adjust 
to the fact that many young Muslims today are more willing to take their political theory 
from Rashid Ghannoushi than from a venerable 'alim . 
The critical refonTI ofIslam is an ongoing project. It is by no means the dominant tendency 
in contemporary Islam, but it is growing rapidly and its results can be seen to some degree 
in every corner of the Muslim world, whether it be an Indonesian university student 
questioning the authority of his village imam, a British Asian Muslim castigating the 'un-
Islamic' practices of her parents, or Abdolkarim Soroush challenging the political legitimacy 
of the Iranian state. Critical Islam is also a gradual process. It is a slow (r)evolution, one 
working away quietly (but with occasional high-profile soundbites) at the grassroots of 
Muslim society. Obviously there is still considerable work to be done. As Talal Asad points 
out, Muslims still have a lot of thinking to do before they can claim to possess a distinctive 
vision of polity. All too often, claims about an Islamic political theory turn out to be little 
lO Hanns Thoma-Venske', The Religious Life of Muslims in Berlin' in Gerholm and Lithman, op. cit. , 
p. 80 
51 Metcalf, op. cit., p. II 
52 James Piscatori, 'The Rushdie Affair and the politics of ambiguity', international Affairs, Vol. 66, 
l'o. 4, 1990,p. 775 
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more than anti-Western polemics, or else reaffirmations of the nation-state with a :few 
'Islamic' terms thrown in for good measure.S3 What can safely be said to be changIing, 
however, are the boundaries of Muslim political community. In summary, then, I warut to 
review the arguments I have made as to why translocality must be seen as a large part of 
these changes. 
The first sense in which transIocal space changes the boundaries of Muslim ]political 
community is related to the fact that in many of the cases we have dealt with corruounity is 
constituted not in accordance with ethno-national identity, but rather in terms <of oale's 
identification with and, more crucially, rearticulation of a particular set of ethical claims (<e.g. 
Islam as a 'good') . Muslims are disembedded from national contexts and resettlecl. in 
interstitial spaces (i.e. 'in' a society but not 'of it) such that Islam becomes investe<l with a 
new political relevance. 'The religious' rather than 'the national' becomes the Eocus;: of 
political identity. A second change relates to how the boundaries of political cOIllI1llllllity are 
transformed in translocal spaces when 'other' cultures and new structural contexts are 
encountered. A good example ofthis is the recasting of classical concepts sllch as;: dar a/-
islam, dar al-harb, and dar al-ahd, which was instigated by Islam's cognisance or its 
minority status in diaspora. Muslim notions of 'inside' and 'outside' have suddenly been 
inverted and traditional forms hegemony (e.g. those seeking to label some Muslims;: as 
deviants or heretics) are forced to redraw the contours of their identity to accoun~ for the 
Muslim 'other'. A third and closely related change concerns the widening of the par=et:ers 
which determine who is permitted to speak on behalf of Islam. What was religious l>ecomes 
'political' as soon as Muslims begin to question the authority of those who have previot:lsly 
been recognised as legitimate sources of knowledge (e.g. the ulama). New inteILectu..als, 
university students and lay Muslims - men and women - can to some degree aU be seen as 
sources of ijtihad and purveyors of authentic Islam. Their debates and critiques, I wan. t to 
argue, constitute a dramatic widening of the Muslim public sphere. Furthennore, its 
emergence can be explained to a large extent as a consequence oftranslocality - inother 
words, the travelling theories, hybrid/diasporic identities and media technologies wil.ich 
Muslims are increasingly embracing. This public sphere also fulfils a crucial politii.cal 
function insofar as it offers a discursive space in which Muslims can articulate their 
normative claims (i .e. 'Islam') from a multiplicity of subject positions. As we have seen, 
though, this is not a space devoid of hegemony. There are still those forces seeking to 
monopolise the political agenda and to denounce any Muslims who deviate frOIll their vision. 
The nature of this arena is such, however, that dissenting voices will always be heilId. A.nd 
as we have seen above, there are those who are doing much more than arguing for a greater 
II One representative example of this genre is Kalim Siddiqui, 'Beyond the Muslim Nation·States' in 
Isma'il R. AI-Faruqi and Abdullah Omar Nasseef(eds.), Social and Natural Sciences: The Islamic 
Perspective, Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981. 
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toleration of different opinions. A number of Muslim thinkers have been undertaking 
ambitious critiques of their religion's traditional conceptual lexicon and producing innovative 
reformulations which help to construct an Islam for contemporary, translocallife. 
Therefore, in seeking to answer the question of how Muslims today are reimagining the 
umma, we can identity two broad, and, in some senses, seemingly contradictory trends. I 
want to argue however that the apparent incompatibility of these tendencies is only an 
illusion because, in reality, they are both aspects of the same process. On the one hand, 
translocality and globalisation are providing Muslims with a greater capacity to communi· 
cate, interact, and otherwise bridge the distances between them. In this sense, translocality 
resonates with the Qur'anic injunction to Muslims of different nations to get to know one 
another (Qur'an 49: 13). It promises that the umma could become a social reality. On the 
other hand, however, translocality also brings together Muslims of diverse sociocultural, 
sectarian and theological backgrounds. By forcing Islam to hold a mirror up to itself, it 
makes it aware of the many differences (and disunities) within. Although these two forces 
are seemingly contradictory - one a call to unity, the other a drive to differentiate - they are 
both constitutive of a single process leading Muslims towards greater 'globality' in the sense 
of a new consciousness of the world as a single space. The Muslim urge to 'relate 
internationally' thus becomes an impetus to negotiate difference, and to refonnulate Islam 
in the face of globality. I am not in any way arguing that the first tendency, that towards 
'unity', will triumph. When I speak ofreimagining the umma, I am talking about more than 
Muslims simply stressing their similarities, de-emphasising their differences and living 
together in a single global community. Rather, I am speaking about Muslims 
reconceptualising the umrna; that is, revising their ideas about who, what and where political 
community can be. Understood in this way - as possessing a critical edge - the idiom of 
'reimagination' potentially has far more radical consequences. 
Conclusion: a new politics oftranslocal space? 
Ro b Walker has noted that most attempts to explore the conjunction of social movements 
and world politics have tended to operate within the normative codes of conventional statist 
politics. He goes on to make the following suggestion: 
An empirical exploration of this conjunction would more usefully begin by 
examining whether particular movements do or do not express these codes, in their 
explicit aspirations or their collective practices. It would ask ahout the articulations 
of identity and difference, self and other, space and time that constrain and inform 
their capacity to rearticulate their understanding of the political under contemporary 
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conditions. It would ask about the connections between such rearticulations In 
different structural locations. 54 
My exploration of Muslim political community has been an attempt to do exactly this. I 
began by arguing that global sociocultural transformations are giving rise to new forms of 
transnational politics which conventional readings of the political - and especially the Realist 
tradition in International Relations - are incapable of accounting for. The nation·state model, 
I suggested, is under threat from a number of'distanciating' processes which disembed 
peoples and cultures from particular territorial locales and spread their social relations across 
space and time. As a result, political identities no longer inhabit the exclusive container of 
the nation-state and must be seen as configured in and between multiple political spaces -
a condition I termed trans/acality. I went on to argue that disciplinary projects outside 
International Relations - namely, postcolonial studies, cultural studies and critical 
anthropology - have developed far more sophisticated ways of thinking about 'the 
international' in the present context, emphasising as they do the fact that 'locality' is now an 
increasingly difficult concept to apprehend given the volume of movement, travel and 
communication between spaces and places. ' [T]he spatial extension of households and 
ethnic communities across national borders', writes Michael Peter Smith, 'is producing new 
patterns of cultural and political appropriation and resistance by transnational migrants and 
refugees who in some ways partake of two nation-states but in other ways move beyond 
them' . ss The declining efficacy of the nation-state means therefore that 'the national' no 
longer possesses a monopoly over descriptions of political identity. This fact has allowed 
non- or post-national formulations of political organisation to enter the picture. As a result 
of this, some writers have been led to speculate about new forms of post-national 
cosmopolitan identity,56 while others have followed Walker's suggestion and undertaken 
studies of particular movements whose discourses imagine non-statist forms of political 
community. The present study can be seen as an example of the latter. I chose to focus on 
Islam because it represents a prominent non-statist, non-national identity discourse which 
today claims widespread - in fact, one would almost be justified in saying truly 'global' -
validity as an ethical construct. Furthermore, there exist today significant translocal Muslim 
communities which have been constituted by a variety of migratory and postcolonial flows. 
My claim is that many of the movements which have arisen out of these communities can 
be seen as a fonn of what Smith has called 'transnational grassroots politics'. 
" Rob Walker, 'Social Movements/World Politics ', Millennium, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994, p. 700 
" Michael Peter Smith', Can You Imagine? Transnational Migration and the Globalization of 
Grassroots Politics' , Social Text, No. 39, Summer 1994, p. 15. Emphasis added. 
" See e.g. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (ed.), Cosmopolilics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the 
Nation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. 
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As we have seen in this final section, trans locality is also contributing to the emergence 0 f 
new forms of 'critical Islam', by producing thinkers committed to the renewal and reform of 
religious dogma. Within translocality, these debates over authority in Islam constitute a new 
form of Muslim public sphere which, in tum, serves to widen the boundaries of Muslim 
political community. In a broad sense, then, we can conclude that the rethinking of political 
community is largely a result of Muslims living in translocal spaces which are themselves 
the product of wider migratory and globalising processes. The example of trans local Islam 
is therefore only one aspect of a much wider trend. Where Muslims are reirnagining the 
umma, other identities have discrepant communal visions - their own forms of 'transnationa.! 
grassroots politics' . The state and its 'International Relations' are still with us, however, and 
will be for some time to come. The state will never go out with a bang, and IR will nevey 
spontaneously combust. Our ambivalent inclinations towards their normative visions will , 
however, most likely intensify over time and, eventually, the borders will overflow. That's 
when they'll all come tumbling out: identities and ideas, separatists and strangers, 
modernities and Muslims ... 
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